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Because of their inherent abstraction, systems ideas are not themselves sufficient for
gaining scientific knowledge or solving practical problems, but they can be a source of
insights into the universality of imperfection, insights which can contribute to a new
scientific world view.  Systems theory offers a metaphysics, or more precisely an
ontology, of imperfection.  Through it, we can heed Spinoza's injunction, “Not to lament,
not to curse, but to understand.”
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Ideas Are for Insight
In this talk, I want to present a conception that I have been working on for a number of
years (Zwick, 1983, 1995) about the use of systems ideas.  I start from the negative and
proceed to the positive.  The negative assertion is that systems ideas by themselves,
unsupplemented by more specific and concrete knowledge (e.g., from the various
disciplines), are insufficient for practical application, either for obtaining knowledge
about the world or for solving problems.  The reason for this is the inherent abstractness
of these ideas.  The positive assertion is that this metaphysics can be a rich source of
insights needed to improve the human condition and a component of a new scientific
world view.
The abstractness of systems ideas is succinctly captured by Bunge’s characterization
(1973) of the systems project as the attempt to construct an “exact and scientific
metaphysics” (ESM).  By metaphysics Bunge means general propositions about the world
which hold for a wide variety of systems (“metaphysics” here thus does not refer to
questions of the existence of God, free will, etc.).  By scientific, he means grounded in,
i.e., drawing upon and contributing to, the sciences.  By exact, he means mathematical, or
capable ultimately of being expressed mathematically (Bunge actually includes
“exactness” within “scientific,” but I pull it out as a separate idea).  This ESM is presently
constituted by a multiplicity of systems theories, e.g., information theory, control theory,
game theory, and the like.  A singular systems theory does not exist.  In a sense, this is
the goal of the systems project, a systems “theory of everything” (TOE) radically different
from the more familiar TOE sought by physicists trying to unify the four fundamental
forces.  A systems “theory of everything” would be a true metaphysics, which would
pertain to everything, not just the physical world and not merely in principle; it would
touch every discipline, not merely physics.
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Here is a slightly different conceptualization: systems theories are less abstract than
mathematics and philosophy but more abstract than theories in particular scientific
disciplines (Boulding, 1956).  By being more abstract than specific theories in the natural
and social sciences, systems theories cannot without supplementary knowledge be
evaluated empirically or used for practical purposes.  Actually, even scientific theories are
not directly testable.  Theories, applied to different phenomena, offer models of these
phenomena, and models, not their parent theories, are confronted by empirical evidence.
Models are linked sets of relations, each a hypothesis which can be falsified, but models
are not necessarily rejected by the failure of specific hypotheses; they may be rescued by
plausible ad hoc adjustments.  Finally, relations involve observables which define a
“model object” appropriate to the phenomenon under study.  This epistemological
framework, based on Bunge’s analysis, is summarized below in Table 1.  Bunge does not
include (2) as a distinct level, and I offer simpler names for the other levels.  I add in
italics the conception that systems theories are triadic in character (ESM), midway in
abstraction between E & M and S.
                                                                          mathematics (E)                  philosophy (M)
5. systems theory [“generic semi-interpreted theory”]     systems theories (ESM)
4. theory [“general theory”]                        theories in the natural and social sciences (S)
3. model [“specific theory”]
2. relation, law, hypothesis
1. observables [“model object”]
Table 1. Epistemological hierarchy. [Bunge’s terms are in brackets].
Models of phenomena (3) are produced either inductively from below by integrating
observed regularities (2) or deductively from above by applying a theory (4) to a model
object (1).  Similarly (in italics), systems theories are produced inductively from below by
identifying isomorphisms between different scientific theories (S) or deductively from
above by adding interpretations to mathematical formalisms (E) or concreteness (and
exactness) to philosophical generalities (M).
This epistemological hierarchy suggests that unless systems-theoretic notions are used in
specific scientific theories and more explicitly in models of particular phenomena, they
are too far removed from the real-world to offer usable knowledge by themselves.  For
example, game theory does not explain behavior observed in auctions and cannot guide
rational action in such settings, but if supplemented by additional information about
economic systems in general and about auctions in particular, game theory could provide
the basis for a descriptive and/or normative theory of auction behavior.
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However, while an economist might draw upon game-theory to develop a model of
auctions, such a model is unlikely to be comprehensible to scientists in other fields, to
other scholars, and to the public at large.  For the general public, the scientific study of
particular phenomena is rarely feasible.  It might seem therefor that the project of
constructing an “exact and scientific metaphysics” is irrelevant except to scientists.
This is not so.  What non-specialists need to navigate the many worldly contexts which
they encounter is insight.  Insight is more usable than theory or methodology because it is
flexible and open-ended.  Insight is what a metaphysics can offer.  The significance of the
systems project, aimed at a metaphysics which is precise and grounded, may well consist
more in its general cultural impact than its scientific fecundity.  This is the positive aspect
of the deep abstraction which characterizes systems ideas.
Insight is Needed into Imperfection
What is not problematic does not require understanding.  It is imperfection which
generates the need for insight.  In the social world, “imperfection” means war, injustice,
exploitation, and the like.  Speaking more narrowly about culture, our values are
imperfect not merely in the difficulty of realizing them, but because the values themselves
are contradictory.  This is the anti-utopian position of Isaiah Berlin (1991) who argues
that cultural values do not resemble the mutually consistent axioms of a formal
mathematical system, but are typically incompatible.  In the natural world, “imperfection”
encompasses the dangers arising in the environment to human beings and other organisms
and, reciprocally, the local and global threats to the environment posed by human action.
In the biological world, “imperfection” includes disease, suffering, and (from the vantage
point of prey) predation.  In the psychological and behavioral worlds, there are
imperfections in our characters and our actions.  And so on.  One need not belabor the
obvious.  Imperfection abounds in the natural and social worlds.  In so far as we must
deal with it, we need insight into its deepest, “metaphysical,” basis.
I am not speaking of imperfection in our models of the world, but in the world itself.
That is, I want to discuss ontology and not epistemology, and employ an objective rather
than a subjective mode of discourse.  Imperfections in models can be included while
retaining an objective stance by considering deficiencies in the “modeling subsystems” of
organisms, organizations, and societies.
To say that imperfection is objective is not to deny that imperfection implies the vantage
point of agents who have interests.  To a first approximation, we humans are the
reference point, as we are the ones making judgments.  But the reference point is actually
larger and includes all forms of life.  Every living system has interests and in so far as
such a system can directly or indirectly further its interests, it exhibits agency.  To make
the notion of “interests” exact, one can define for a system a utility function.  Systems
having interests is the subject of game theory, in which utility is given formal treatment
(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).  Utility with respect to reproduction is “fitness,”
hence the use of game-theory in evolutionary biology, but utility is a broader notion.
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From a biological perspective, the title of this essay might have referred to understanding
“vulnerability” or “hazard,” but “imperfection” is plainer and more general.
From the perspective of individual living systems, the universe is less than perfect.
Instead of speaking of imperfection, one could speak of “problems” which we or other
organisms face, but the word “imperfection” has the virtue of suggesting an objective
character to these problems.  Imperfection is not merely in the eye of the beholder.
Problems reflect a mismatch between what is actual and what is ideal to some agent, and
what is ideal may be subjective, but it may alternatively be objective.  The survival needs
of organisms are objective facts.  More importantly, the causes of the mismatch between
ideal and actual are objective features of the world, and many of these features are
ubiquitous, perhaps even universal.  This is a Gnostic or Kabbalist view.  Imperfection is
pervasive, and an exact and scientific metaphysics would lay bare its most general, i.e.,
ontological, foundations.  To regard imperfection as a metaphysical condition, however,
does not mean that this condition is irremediable, just that problems are lawful and
ubiquitous. Perfection is precluded by limitation, and limitation is the precondition of
existence.  What remains possible is perfecting, the verb, which is better anyway than
perfection, the noun, a state which is unattainable, because only the process and not the
state produces the drama of history, the absence of whose performance would surely be
an imperfection.
I want to make several qualifying remarks concerning this point of view.  First, let me
mention the position, more popular in the past, articulated for example by Leibniz and
mocked by Voltaire, that everything is perfect just as it is.  It is hard to imagine a 21st
century writer who would find such a position still worthy of parody.  Even were this true
at some “high level of reality,” at the level we live on, it is untrue.  Moreover, even the
highest truth is not the whole truth, and the whole takes precedence over the highest.
From a religious, or, more precisely, a doctrinal perspective, the pervasiveness of
imperfection raises the theological problem of theodicy, i.e., the conundrum of how there
could be a God who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, given the evil and
suffering in the world.  A systems metaphysics, being necessarily silent about the
existence of God, cannot solve this conundrum, but the “secular theodicy” which such a
metaphysics can offer might be a valuable corrective to the Leibnizian optimism of
current anthropic speculation.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the negativity which afflicts a focus on imperfection.  A
glass half empty is also half-full, so the word “imperfection” is itself imperfect in its
exclusively negative connotation.  Imperfection necessarily encompasses the possibility
of perfecting.  I mean actually to assert something more like a mixture of perfection and
imperfection or a delicate balance between the two, perhaps something like the idea of the
“edge of chaos” (Langton, 1992).
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Systems Ideas about Imperfection
There are many systems ideas and themes which bear on the subject of imperfection and
what follows is a only a sample.
• Tensions, not restricted to formal mathematical systems, between incompleteness and
inconsistency
• Imbalances involving other fundamental dualities, such as variety and constraint,
order and disorder, unity and multiplicity
• Problems of boundary, e.g., the issue of crisp vs. fuzzy boundaries, excessive or
inappropriate openness or closedness
• Instability, the destruction of order through chaos or catastrophe; or, conversely:
overstability, rigidification
• Pathologies of (feedback/feedforward) control
• Aberrations of hierarchical order, including the opposing needs of centralization and
decentralization, differentiation and integration
• Informational parasitism (internal or external)
• Dependence upon and constraint by the environment
• Limitations of agency: multiple deciders or objectives (inconsistency) or uncertainty
(incompleteness), problems of global optimization, computational intractability, and
undecidability; unintended consequences and counter-intuitive effects
• Difficulties presented by other systems; competition, predation, exploitation; tensions
between autonomy and interdependence; dilemmas involving multiple agents
• Embeddedness in and thus control by more encompassing systems
• Impermanence and fragility of order; vulnerability to events on smaller, larger, or the
same scale
• Limitations of modeling subsystems: the inherent indistinguishability of variety and
noise, of reality and illusion
This is just a list of systems ideas relevant to the theme of imperfection.  If one tabulated,
instead of ideas, the theories which bear on this subject, one would include most of the
well-developed theories central to the systems project, e.g., information theory, graph
theory, dynamic systems theory, control theory, game theory, non-equilibrium
thermodynamics, evolutionary theory, etc.  For convenience in this essay, I use the name
“Problematics” as a working label for the enterprise of collecting, formulating, and
organizing systems ideas about imperfection.  In earlier work (Zwick, 1983), I tried to
weave together such ideas into a metaphysical narrative about imperfection.  This essay
and its precurser (Zwick, 1995) explain the motivation for this undertaking.
The ideas on this list, and other related ideas, can be given exact expression and linked to
current scientific knowledge.  There is thus the possibility of an ontology of problems, a
systems metaphysics organized around the theme of imperfection.  But here we come face
to face with the imperfection of systems theory itself.  As already noted, a unitary theory
does not exist; instead we have a multiplicity of theories, weakly linked to one another.
Some means must still be found to bring order and unity to this multiplicity.
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I suspect what is needed for this is something like the hierarchy of systems types sketched
by Boulding (1956): (i) frameworks, (ii) clockworks, (iii) control (cybernetic) systems,
(iv) open systems self-maintained by matter-energy throughput, (v) genetic-societal
systems (plants), (vi) purposeful information-processing systems (animals), (vii) self-
conscious symbol-processing systems (humans), and, not at all discussed by Boulding,
(ix) “transcendental” systems.  Such a hierarchy brings the contemporary idea of
“complexity” into proximity with the traditional idea of “being.”  The notion of
complexity, while capable of being interpreted in many different ways, can be made exact
and scientific, but the notion of being is metaphysically more substantial.  From the
perspective of the construction of an exact and scientific metaphysics, it is interesting and
probably not accidental that Boulding’s hierarchy evokes -- even resembles -- the
religious-philosophical idea of the “great chain of being” (Lovejoy, 1936), which was
widely accepted in Western culture though most of its history.  (This traditional idea also
directly addressed the ubiquity of imperfection, viewing it as a necessary part of a greater
perfection.)  With Boulding’s proposal as a first approximation, one can at least imagine a
systems-theoretic version of “the great chain” which would satisfy the dual requirements
of being exact and scientific.  No doubt some of the assumptions (e.g., the principles of
continuity and plenitude) which characterized the traditional idea would have to be
discarded or altered.  As the “skeleton” of an ESM, a modern “chain of complexity”
would probably have to be discrete with a modest number of levels, and would have to
accept contingency, anathema to traditional doctrine, as fundamentally implicated in the
creative generativity of nature.
Why would one undertake to construct a systems-theoretic ontology of imperfection?
The motivation is deeper than the mere solution of problems.  Metaphysics is a basis for
morals (Murdoch, 1992).  Spinoza for example begins his Ethics (1677) with a systems
metaphysics (Jonas, 1965).  This approach was natural in the premodern era: one begins
with a description of the world and then considers how one should live in it; one moves
from “is” to “ought.”  Philosophers since Hume have however pointed out that one
cannot derive “ought” from “is.”  True enough: fact by itself is not sufficient, but it is
necessary.  Though domains of fact and value may be sharply distinguished, they
interpenetrate in a complex manner, like two basins of attraction of a nonlinear dynamic
system whose separating boundary is fractal.  Moreover, value emerges in a world of fact.
The existence of value is a fact.  The notion of utility, developed in game theory and
grounded in biology and the social sciences, bridges the two domains.  (More generally,
game theory itself, being capable of both descriptive and normative use, exhibits the
interconnection of fact and value.)  The formal idea of utility is much richer than its
colloquial connotation of usefulness, which is largely external in character: utility might
also quantify value internal to a system, i.e., perfection of structure.  The notion of utility
augments those of matter, energy, and information as a fourth fundamental category,
instantiated and visible in the phenomena of life.  It is a notion which can encompass both
the objective and the subjective, both the necessary and the contingent; on the human
scale, both needs and wants.
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Without understanding what is, one really cannot consider what ought to be, at least not
effectively, so metaphysics bears significantly on ethics.  Game theory, for example,
brings exactness and empirical knowledge into contact with ethics.  From insight into the
ontology of imperfection there follows the possibility and thus the responsibility of
perfecting, of “tikkun,” to use a term from Kabbalist metaphysics meaning the fixing of
metaphysical imperfection as far as is possible.  Or, as the philosopher Levinas (1989) has
argued, one should even reverse the sequence and say that ethics precedes ontology
because it motivates -- or should motivate -- metaphysics, as it does for Spinoza.
“Problematics,” that is, systems inquiry into the origins and nature of imperfection is not
sufficient.  Problematics is less than “diagnostics” -- being able to say what the critical
issues are in any particular problem.  One might imagine a physician’s desk manual (a
DSM-V) for the diagnosis of metaphysical ills.  Diagnostics in turn falls short of
“therapeutics” -- knowledge of what to do about the problem, of how perfecting might be
accomplished.  But the progression from problematics to diagnostics to therapeutics,
however important, is not to be rushed.  Facile diagnostics and simplistic therapeutics are
often counterproductive, this being one of the lessons gained from systems thinking.  The
assumption that we already understand problems adequately is usually illusory.  What is
needed most to solve problems is not theory or methodology but insight, if it is deep and
especially if it is widely shared.
The Contribution of Systems Ideas
A metaphysics of imperfection would contribute to a new scientific world view which is
coherent and moral.  In a reductionist world view, there is no imperfection, only
fundamental particles and their interactions, and life is a mere epiphenomenon.  Systems
thought offers a radically different view.  It replaces the hegemony of the fundamental
with the priority of the central, and hence of the general.  From the perspective of the
central, all systems are ontologically equal (though from the perspective of “complexity”
-- or “being” -- they are not).  Ultimately, also, all are flawed by limitation, which is the
price of existence.  To use Murdoch’s phrase (1992), systems are “partial wholes”
[emphasis added].  Again, it is important to point to the virtue in the flaw.  In the words
of the poet Leonard Cohen, “there is a crack in everything; this is to let the light in.”
A systems metaphysics can be a bridge from science to the humanities, the arts,
philosophy, religion.  There was once, from the medieval period to the beginnings of
modern science, an integrated view of matter, life, mind, cosmos.  This view suffered,
however, from an overvaluation of order and harmony, from being inexact and
empirically undeveloped, and from being tied to one religious tradition.  It eventually
disintegrated with the rise of science, leaving a cultural vacuum described poignantly in
Yeats’ complaint, “...all coherence lost...”.  Post-modern nihilism may be the final act of
this decline, but other developments hint at the possibility of a recovery of cultural
coherence, of a new integrated world view centered in science (Toulmin, 1982) but open
to other realms of human experience.  The project of constructing an exact and scientific
metaphysics, however fragmented and fragile an undertaking, is a vital part of this
possibility.
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It is significant also that systems ideas can contribute not only to culture at large but to
“personal knowledge” (Polanyi, 1964), which can be individually appropriated and used
in our private lives.  Because the systems view does not reduce, because it gives priority
to form (which we perceive) over matter (about which our direct experience is limited),
because it seeks cross-level truths (applicable “above” to natural and social systems, and
“below” to ourselves), and because it is not committed solely to 3rd person objectivity but
encompasses also 1st person subjectivity, for these and other reasons, systems ideas,
unlike most ideas in science, can be meaningful to us.  They might even help us
understand the lawfulness but not hopelessness of our own imperfections.
To close the circle of this argument (and perhaps return to the negative): the strength of
an exact and scientific metaphysics is also its weakness.  The main obstacle preventing
systems ideas from contributing significantly to a new scientific world view and to
personal knowledge is the abstractness of these ideas, the very abstractness from which
their scope and significance derives.  This abstractness limits the number of people who
become aware of systems ideas.  It also tends to restrict the understanding of these ideas
to a strictly intellectual mode, which lacks the emotional force needed to change our
image of and relation to the world.  This poses an important educational challenge, but
that is another subject.
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